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IS SELF-ABORTION A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
SUZANNE M. ALFORD
INTRODUCTION
Kawana Ashley, an unwed, pregnant teenager, had reasons for
wanting to terminate her pregnancy.1 Unfortunately for Ashley, she
was twenty-five weeks pregnant and could no longer obtain a legal
abortion because the fetus was viable.2 So, on March 27, 1994, she ob-
tained a gun and shot herself across the abdomen in an attempt to
terminate her pregnancy.3 Ashley was rushed to the hospital and sur-
vived her self-inflicted gunshot wound.4 Her fetus, however, had been
struck by the bullet and died fifteen days later.5 Ashley was prose-
cuted for manslaughter and third-degree murder,6 but the Florida Su-
preme Court held that a pregnant woman cannot be charged with
these crimes for self-aborting.7 The court held that, under Florida law,
Ashley could self-abort at any time during her pregnancy, even when
the fetus was viable.8
Copyright © 2003 by Suzanne M. Alford.
1. See State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997) (stating that Ashley’s grandmother
would not assist Ashley in caring for another baby if Ashley became pregnant again).
2. Id.; FLA. STAT. ch. 390.001(2) (LEXIS through 1994 Legis. Sess.) (providing that “[n]o
termination of pregnancy shall be performed on any human being in the last trimester of preg-
nancy [except] in cases in which the termination is “necessary to save the life or protect the
health of a pregnant woman”).
3. Ashley, 701 So. 2d at 339–40.
4. Id. at 339.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 342.
8. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on abortion
does not clearly address the issue of self-abortion.9 The Court’s deci-
sion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey10 established a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy before the fetus is viable through a surgical
abortion.11 Casey created a basic framework for understanding the le-
gal status of abortion, but it also left certain aspects of a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy a mystery. A woman’s right to self-
abort is one of these aspects.
The lack of attention paid to self-abortion by the Supreme Court,
however, does not mean that self-abortion is not a real and pressing
problem. Self-abortion may be thought of as an antiquated form of
abortion that was only necessary in the days before Roe v. Wade,12
when women were often unable to obtain the assistance of doctors in
terminating a pregnancy. Self-abortions, however, still occur in
American society. As evidenced by Kawana’s story, desperate women
take various measures to abort their fetuses. Methods range from in-
serting coat hangers into the cervix13 to utilizing at-home abortion kits
found on the Internet.14 Not only are self-abortions currently being
practiced in the United States, but the danger they pose to both the
women and the fetuses is real. Women who perform self-abortions
9. The term “self-abortion” refers to methods of abortion that women create and use
without the assistance of a medical professional. Examples of self-abortion include the use of
drugs (kerosene, lead, herbs), instrumentation (injection of air or insertion of hangers), cervical
dilation, and trauma (blows to the abdomen). Benjamin Honigman et al., Reemergence of Self-
Induced Abortions, 11 J. EMERGENCY MED. 105, 107 (1993). The term does not include the
morning-after pill, which is taken within seventy-two hours of possible conception of the same
hormones found in birth control pills. Few Private Physicians Offer Women Abortion Pill,
L.A.TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at 3. The term also excludes “medical abortions,” which are a
method of abortion by which a woman takes a series of pills (commonly known as RU-486) that
first cause the uterus to be unable to support the fertilized egg and then cause the uterus to con-
tract and expel the egg. Stacey Schultz, Long-Awaited Abortion Pill Will Offer More Privacy—
But No Less Controversy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 2000, at 79. Although a woman
takes the pills with a medical abortion, this method of terminating pregnancy is distinguishable
from other methods of self-abortion, because a woman may only take the drug with a prescrip-
tion from a licensed doctor, and must visit the doctor a few times during the abortion process.
Liza Mundy, The Quiet Afterlife of RU-486, WASH. POST., June 10, 2001, at W19.
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. Id. at 870.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Honigman et al., supra note 9, at 105.
14. Don’t Buy Abortion Kits Over the Net, FDA Warns, FDA CONSUMER, Sept./Oct. 1997,
at 3 (discussing the dangers of self-abortion kits).
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risk, among other things, infection, sepsis,15 septic shock, future infer-
tility, and even death.16 Moreover, women who self-abort may also
injure the fetus while failing to terminate the pregnancy, which could
result in a child being born with defects.17
Despite the seriousness of this issue, a thorough analysis of
whether self-abortion is a fundamental right has not been conducted
by either the courts or by legal scholars. This Note attempts to fill this
gap. It examines whether there is a fundamental right to self-abort at
any stage of a pregnancy. Part I establishes that self-abortion still oc-
curs in America, and that a state supreme court recently suggested
that self-abortion may be a right. Part II shows that America’s current
abortion framework under Roe and Casey implies that a woman does
not have a right to self-abort. Given that the courts have not squarely
addressed the issue of whether self-abortion is a fundamental right,
Part III undertakes this analysis. Applying the fundamental rights
test, Part III concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause does not encompass a fundamental right to self-abort during
any stage of a woman’s pregnancy. Finally, Part IV buttresses the
conclusion drawn in Part III by drawing an analogy between self-
abortions and a state’s right to proscribe a person from harming him-
self.
I.  SELF-ABORTION IN AMERICA TODAY
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade, which permits
a woman to obtain an abortion legally,18 it might appear that self-
abortion is no longer an issue in American society. This appearance is
misleading. Although it is difficult to obtain empirical data on self-
abortions because the act is secretive by nature, various sources indi-
cate that self-abortions continue to occur in American society post-
15. Sepsis is a “toxic condition resulting from the spread of bacteria or their products from
a focus of infection.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1064 (10th ed. 2001).
16. See Honigman et al., supra note 9, at 106–08 (cataloging the possible injuries that can
result from legal and illegal abortions).
17. Don’t Buy Abortion Kits Over the Net, FDA Warns, supra note 14, at 3.
18. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
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Roe.19 For example, in 1993, three hospital physicians20 in Denver,
Colorado, wrote that they witnessed a resurgence in injuries from
self-abortion.21 Further, in 1997, the Food and Drug Administration
issued a public warning about the dangers of self-abortion kits avail-
able for purchase on the Internet.22 Moreover, a simple Internet
search for home abortion information yields several websites dis-
cussing various inexpensive herbal self-abortion techniques.23
Because self-abortion continues to occur in American society,
the legal system must be prepared to address whether it is a funda-
mental right. Few courts and scholars have addressed the issue di-
rectly. But, in a rare decision addressing self-abortion, the Florida
Supreme Court recently ruled that, based on a reading of common
law, a woman may self-abort at any time during pregnancy.24 The
court reasoned:
At common law, while a third party could be held criminally liable
for causing injury or death to a fetus, the pregnant woman could not
be: “At common law an operation on the body of a woman quick
with child, with intent thereby to cause her miscarriage, was an in-
dictable offense, but it was not an offense in her to so treat her own
body . . . .”25
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court case suggests that self-abortion was
19. See Richard Guzman, Planned Parenthood Receives $500,000 Grant, DESERT SUN
(Palm Springs), Nov. 26, 2002, at 3B (asserting that Sylvia Feliciano, a Planned Parenthood
worker, has “seen girls who have performed self-abortions”); Honigman et al., supra note 9, at
105–06 (discussing the medical injuries suffered by two women who attempted self-abortion);
Dan Luzadder, Lawsuit Targets New Restriction on Abortions, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver),
Dec. 23, 1998, at 7A (“Sylvia Clark, Planned Parenthood president and CEO in Colorado,
warned that the [parental notification] law will force girls who are afraid to tell parents of a
pregnancy into self-abortion . . . .”); Kate Michelman, 26 Years Later, Abortion Debate Still
Raging, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 22, 1999, at 9B (asserting that abortion providers are
concerned that obstacles limiting abortion access lead to self-abortion).
20. The group of three authors consisted of an emergency room surgeon, an obstetrics and
gynecology specialist, and a psychiatrist. Honigman et al., supra note 9, at 105.
21. Id.
22. Don’t Buy Abortion Kits Over the Net, FDA Warns, supra note 14, at 3.
23. See, e.g., Herbal Abortion, Henriette’s Herbal Homepage, at http://ibiblio.org/herbmed/
archives/Best/1995/herbal-abortion.html (Nov. 17, 1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(describing “a formula that is intended to induce a miscarriage”); Self-Help: Abortion Remedy—
Vitamin-C, at http://www.sisterzeus.com/Hsp1shlp.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (explaining how to use Vitamin C to induce a miscarriage).
24. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 340–42 (Fla. 1997).
25. Id. at 340 (quoting State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 636 (Conn. 1904)).
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traditionally legal and continues to be legal today.26 This does not,
however, mean that self-abortion is a fundamental right.
II.  THE ROE-CASEY FRAMEWORK’S
IMPLICATIONS ON SELF-ABORTION
Though the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling suggests that self-
abortion was legal under common law, that does not answer the ques-
tion as to whether self-abortion is a fundamental right. While the
United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence suggests that a woman does not have a
fundamental right to self-abort. America’s current legal framework
governing abortion is established by two Supreme Court decisions:
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. These two cases did
not directly address the issue of self-abortion, but they asserted that
physician-provided abortions are a fundamental, albeit limited, right.
The Roe-Casey framework also implied that a woman does not have a
fundamental right to self-abort.
In Roe, the Court found unconstitutional a Texas law that crimi-
nalized the performance of an abortion upon a pregnant woman.27
The Court concluded that a woman’s right to terminate her preg-
nancy is included within the Fourteenth Amendment’s implied right
to privacy, but it also held that the right to abort was limited. “[T]he
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but . . . this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.”28 Consequently, “the State does have an
important and legitimate interest in [both] preserving and protecting
26. See id. at 342–43 (“This Court cannot abrogate willy-nilly a centuries-old principle of
the common law—which is grounded in the wisdom of experience and has been adopted by the
legislature—and install in its place a contrary rule bristling with red flags and followed by no
other court in the nation.”).
27. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). The pertinent portion of the statute stated
[i]f any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly pro-
cure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards
her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby pro-
cure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more
than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By
“abortion” is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the
woman’s womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Id. at 117 n.1 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (Vernon 1961)).
28. Id. at 154.
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the health of the pregnant woman . . . and . . . in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life.”29
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court expanded on the rul-
ing in Roe. The Court held that a state could proscribe abortion after
the viability point if it provided an exception for the mother’s health.30
The Court also held that, before viability, a state may enact regula-
tions designed to protect the mother’s health and inform her decision
to abort,31 so long as the regulations do not pose an undue burden on
a woman seeking an abortion.32 The Court concluded that “an undue
burden exists” if the regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before
the fetus attains viability.”33
Although Casey did not specifically address self-abortion, its
holding implies that a woman does not have a constitutional right to
self-abort. The Court concluded that, after a fetus is viable, “the in-
dependent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness
be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman [to abort].”34 The Court further reasoned: “In some broad
sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability
has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing
child.”35 Thus, because a woman does not have a constitutional right
to terminate her pregnancy after her fetus is viable, it logically follows
that she does not have the right to self-abort after the viability point.
Casey further implies that a woman does not have a constitu-
tional right to self-abort even before viability. The Casey Court held
that a state may enact regulations “designed to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion” and to ensure that the decision to abort
is “thoughtful and informed,”36 so long as the regulations “do not con-
stitute an undue burden.”37 Thus, abortion regulations aimed at pro-
tecting a woman’s health are valid if they do not constitute a “sub-
stantial obstacle” to a woman’s ability to abort.38 Further, Casey
29. Id. at 162.
30. 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
31. Id. at 872.
32. Id. at 878.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
 36. Id. at 872.
37. Id. at 878.
38. Id.
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implies that regulations not aimed at protecting the life of the mother
can also pass the undue burden test. The Court concluded that a state
regulation requiring a woman to wait twenty-four hours before un-
dergoing an abortion was not a substantial obstacle.39 Thus, a measure
which posed financial burdens and inconvenience to some women
seeking abortions, yet was unrelated to the goal of promoting the
mother’s health, passed the undue burden test.
The Court explained its decision to uphold the waiting period by
reasoning that Roe did not guarantee the right to “abortion on de-
mand,” but rather, established “a right to decide to terminate a preg-
nancy free of undue interference by the State.”40 Under this interpre-
tation of the constitutional right to abort, a woman does not have the
right to abort in any manner that she chooses, even before viability.
Consequently, a state probably has the power to proscribe self-
abortion as a means of aborting, even before viability, so long as this
restriction does not create a substantial obstacle to women seeking to
terminate their pregnancies. Casey upheld a twenty-four-hour waiting
period, which was both burdensome and arguably unrelated to pro-
tecting the mother’s health. Therefore, it is likely that regulations
prohibiting self-abortions would also be permitted under this frame-
work because they are intended to protect the mother’s health from
the serious potential health hazards of self-abortions.
III.  APPLYING THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS TEST TO SELF-ABORTION
The Roe-Casey framework establishes a right to a doctor-
provided abortion at certain stages of pregnancy, but it leaves unan-
swered the question of whether there is a fundamental right to self-
abort. Though the Roe-Casey framework implies that self-abortion is
not a fundamental right, the cases do not address the point directly.
At first glance, it may appear that the right to self-abortion should
simply mirror that of surgical and medical abortions, which would
mean that self-abortion is a protected right up to the point of fetal vi-
ability. However, self-abortion more strongly implicates the state’s in-
terest in the mother’s health than medical and surgical abortions. A
state may wish to proscribe self-abortions at all stages of pregnancy
because of its concern that a pregnant woman will seriously injure
39. Id. at 887.
40. Id.
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herself, whereas surgical and medical abortions are considered rela-
tively safe medical procedures.41 Moreover, a state may also have an
interest in protecting a fetus from being injured in a self-abortion that
fails to terminate the pregnancy. For these reasons, self-abortion is
distinguishable from surgical and medical abortion. Therefore, a
separate analysis is needed to determine whether a fundamental right
to self-abort exists at any time during pregnancy.
The Supreme Court has found that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain “fundamental rights and
liberty interests.”42 Although the practice of identifying fundamental
rights “has neither rested on any single textual basis nor expressed a
consistent theory,”43 the Court has relied on an examination of
America’s history and tradition to find such rights. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court articulated a two-part test to determine
whether a right is fundamental.44 First, the Court held that “we have
regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . and ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed . . . .’”45 Second, the Court required
a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”46
Consequently, a two-pronged test should be applied to deter-
mine whether self-abortion is a fundamental right. First, there must
be a careful description of the right at issue.47 Second, there must be a
41. See Laurie D. Elam-Evans et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 1999,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: CDC SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Nov. 29, 2002, at
28 tbl.19 (reflecting 0.6 deaths per 100,000 legal abortions in 1997).
42. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
43. Id. at 756 (Souter, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 720–21.
45. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)). However, the Glucksberg
Court appears to collapse these two elements together, such that if the potential fundamental
right is not “deeply rooted” in American history and tradition, it is almost certainly not implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Similarly, this Note relies on the analysis of whether self-
abortion and the larger right to harm one’s self are firmly embedded in American history and
tradition. If one concludes that self-abortion and self-harm are not deeply rooted in American
history and tradition, there is no need to ask whether self-abortion is essential to ordered lib-
erty.
46. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990)).
47. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
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thorough examination of whether self-abortion is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”48
A. “Careful Description” of the Asserted Right
Self-abortion is the right of a pregnant woman to terminate her
pregnancy by herself. This right does not include the situation where
a woman receives medical help in terminating the pregnancy—such as
where a woman takes a prescription medication intended to induce
miscarriage. Rather, the right of self-abortion only includes instances
where a woman completes the abortion herself without assistance.
Moreover, the right permits a woman to self-abort at any time during
her pregnancy, even after the fetus is viable.
B. Is Self-Abortion Firmly Rooted in American History and
Tradition?
A close examination of common law in both England and the
United States reveals that women could be held criminally liable for
self-aborting or even for submitting to abortions performed on them.
Indeed, some legal scholars and courts throughout English and
American history have concluded that women may be tried criminally
for self-aborting.
1. English common and statutory law. Early English common
law provided very limited criminal punishment for abortion. In 1648,
Edward Coke asserted that “quickening,” the point at which a mother
becomes aware of the fetus through its motion, was the dividing line
between noncriminal and criminal abortion.49 He wrote: “If a woman
be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her
wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no
murder . . . .”50 Thus, abortion after quickening, which usually oc-
curred late in the fourth or early in the fifth month of pregnancy, was
only considered a misdemeanor at early common law.51
48. Id. (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion)).
49. EDWARD COKE, THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50
(London, W. Clarke 1817).
50. Id.
51. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900, at 3 (1978) (explaining the concept and timing of quickening).
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English common law also addressed the issue of whether a
woman could be held criminally liable for self-aborting after quick-
ening. Although it has been contended that the common law did not
permit punishment of women who self-aborted or submitted to abor-
tion,52 there is case law to the contrary. In the 1602 case of Regina v.
Webb,53 a woman was indicted for self-aborting through the use of
poison.54 Although the defendant received a general pardon—it is un-
clear whether she was pardoned before or after conviction—this case
illustrates that, from an early point in the development of British
common law, a woman could be criminally prosecuted for self-
aborting.55
In 1803, the passage of Lord Ellenborough’s Act56 clarified that
British law permitted the prosecution of women committing or sub-
mitting to abortion performed upon themselves. The Act not only
reinforced the common law idea that postquickening abortion was a
capital crime, but also declared that prequickening abortion was a
transportable offense that entailed deportation to a penal colony.57
Thus, the Act ensured tough criminal punishments for both prequick-
ening and postquickening abortions.
52. See Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1783
(1991) (“[S]ociety consistently refused to condemn women’s participation in the abortion
crime.”).
53. JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982, at 7 (1988) (citing 5 CALENDAR
OF ASSIZE RECORDS, SURREY INDICTMENTS, ELIZABETH I, at 512 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1980)).
54. The woman ingested poison “with the intention of spoiling and destroying the infant in
the womb . . . [and] by reason of eating the aforesaid poison, spoiled and destroyed then and
there the infant in her womb, as a pernicious example to all malefactors offending in like man-
ner . . . .” Id.
55. Id.
56. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, §2 (1803) (Eng.).
57. The Act provided:
any person or persons . . . [who] willfully and maliciously administer to, or cause to be
administered to, or taken by any woman, any medicines, drug, or other substance or
thing whatsoever, or shall use or employ, or cause or procure to be used or employed
any instrument or other means whatsoever, with intent thereby to cause or procure
the miscarriage of any woman not being, or not being proved to be, quick with child
at the time of administering such things or using such means, that then and in every
such case the person or persons so offending, their counselors, aiders, and abettors,
knowing of and privy to such offence, shall be and are hereby declared to be guilty of
felony, and shall be liable to be fined, imprisoned, set in and upon the pillory, pub-
lickly [sic] or privately whipped . . . or to be transported beyond the seas for any term
not exceeding fourteen years, at the discretion of the court before which such of-
fender shall be tried and convicted.
43 Geo. 3, c. 58, §2 (1803) (Eng.).
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Further, case law following the passage of Ellenborough’s Act
cemented the criminal culpability of women who self-aborted. In Rex
v. Russell,58 the court debated the legality of self-aborting.59 The
prosecutor in this case argued that England’s abortion statute “makes
it criminal to administer any poison or other noxious thing to a
woman with child, whether quick or not, with intent to procure abor-
tion, is general, and includes all persons; it therefore applies as well to
the woman herself as to another person administering to her.”60 The
prosecutor further argued that “[i]ndependent of that statute, it was a
misdemeanor at common law in a woman to take any substance with
intent to procure abortion.”61 Eight of the twelve judges agreed with
the prosecutor’s assertions, and held that the woman taking the poi-
sonous substance with the intent to abort was felo de se—a felon
against herself—in the crime of abortion.62 However, because the
woman who aborted her fetus died as a result of the procedure, the
court’s comments on self-abortion are dicta.63 Interestingly, the court
apparently considered the woman’s actions a felony against herself
rather than a crime against the fetus. This approach could be analo-
gized to self-abortion under the Roe-Casey framework, which permits
prohibition of self-abortion based on the state’s interest in protecting
the health of the mother.64
2. American common and statutory law. Unlike the English
common and statutory law, the historical treatment of self-abortion
rights in American common and statutory law is ambiguous. In its
earliest days, the United States lacked abortion statutes. Instead,
states derived their abortion laws from the British common law.65 At
this stage, states commonly adopted the early British common law
concept that self-aborting or submitting to abortion was not a crime if
it occurred before quickening.66 Connecticut became the first state to
58. 168 Eng. Rep. 1302 (K.B. 1832) (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1305 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1306.
63. Id.
64. See supra Part II.
65. MOHR, supra note 51, at 3.
66. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of
the Foetus, 1664–1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 500 n.226
(1968) (asserting that at common law a woman was not criminally liable for aborting before
quickening).
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criminalize abortion through statute in 1821.67 The provision, which
was primarily a poison control law, criminalized the administration of
a poisonous substance “to cause or procure the miscarriage of any
woman, then being quick with child.”68 The law was aimed primarily
at apothecaries who sold the poisons to women, and did not punish
the women who ingested the toxins.69 Indeed, such early abortion
statutes appeared to consider women seeking abortions as victims of
their own moral weaknesses who needed state protection, rather than
as felons.70
The legal consequences of a woman’s participation in abortion,
however, soon changed markedly in many states. In 1845, New York
criminalized a woman’s participation in her own abortion through
statute.71 Fourteen other states ultimately adopted similar provisions
in their abortion laws.72 The New York statute provided:
Every woman who shall solicit of any person any medicine, drug, or
substance or thing whatever, and shall take the same, or shall submit
to any operation, or other means whatever, with intent thereby to
procure a miscarriage, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail, not less than three months nor more than one year, or by a fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.73
This statute was similar to Ellenborough’s Act because it provided
criminal punishment for women self-aborting or submitting to abor-
tion, regardless of whether the fetus was quick.
In addition to statutes providing criminal penalties for self-
aborting, cases in at least two other states show that the common law
also permitted prosecution for self-aborting after the fetus had quick-
ened. In Smith v. State,74 Maine’s highest court stated that, at common
law, if a woman takes poison to induce a miscarriage or permits a man
to beat her for the same purpose, both of the acts are criminal if they
67. MOHR, supra note 51, at 20–21.
68. Id. at 21 (quoting THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 152–
53 (Hartford, S.G. Goodrich, & Huntington & Hopkins 1821)).
69. Id. at 22.
70. Buell, supra note 52, at 1783.
71. Id. at 1785.
72. Id.
73. Means, supra note 66, at 454 n.101 (quoting Act of May 13, 1845, ch. 260, § 3, 1845 N.Y.
Laws 285–86).
74. 33 Me. 48 (1851).
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are intended to and in fact do injure the fetus.75 However, the court
narrowed its conclusion by stating that the fetus must be quick at the
time of the self-abortion.76 Nearly a century later, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court similarly held in In re Vince that, at common law, a
woman could be prosecuted for self-aborting her fetus if the fetus had
quickened.77 The comments on the illegality of self-abortion in Smith
and In re Vince were mere dicta, however, because women were not
actually prosecuted for their abortions in those cases.78
However, other states rejected the notion that women could be
criminally liable for aborting their fetuses. In State v. Carey,79 Con-
necticut’s highest court discussed the right of a man to injure his own
body without criminal penalty, and applied this same reasoning to
abortion.80 The Court held:
At common law an operation on the body of a woman quick with
child, with intent thereby to cause her miscarriage, was an indictable
offense, but it was not an offense in her to so treat her own body, or
to assent to such treatment from another; and the aid she might give
to the offender in the physical performance of the operation did not
make her an accomplice in his crime.81
In 1963, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the court’s holding
in Carey that a woman cannot be guilty of self-aborting or submitting
to abortion.82
The conflicting views of state supreme courts and state abortion
statutes show that self-abortion was neither clearly permitted nor uni-
formly prohibited. Thus the right to self-abort was not traditionally
accepted in American legal history. According to the Glucksberg
analysis, a right cannot be considered fundamental unless it is “deeply
75. Id. at 55.
76. Id. The court explained, “[i]f, before the mother had become sensible of its motion in
the womb, it was not a crime; if afterwards, when it was considered by the common law, that the
child had a separate and independent existence, it was held highly criminal.” Id.
77. In re Vince, 67 A.2d 141, 144 (N.J. 1949).
78. See Smith, 33 Me. at 53 (noting that the woman in question had died from the abortion
procedure; although the court never expressly addresses the notion, it can be inferred that there
was no postmortem prosecution of the woman); In re Vince, 67 A.2d at 144 (“Since respondent
was not quick with child at the time of the alleged abortion she cannot be indicted for the com-
mon law crime or for conspiracy to commit common law abortion . . . .”).
79. 56 A. 632 (Conn. 1904).
80. Id. at 635–36.
81. Id. at 636.
82. In re Vickers, 123 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Mich. 1963).
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rooted” in American history and tradition. Consequently, because
there was no traditional right to self-abort in American history, self-
abortion is not a fundamental right.
IV.  A STATE’S RIGHT TO PROSCRIBE HARMS TO ONE’S SELF
The above analysis showed that self-abortion is not a fundamen-
tal right under the Glucksberg analysis. One can reach the same con-
clusion by analogizing self-abortions in relation to suicide laws. A
state’s right to prohibit self-abortion is based not only on its interest
in the potential life of the fetus, but also on its interest in protecting
the mother. A survey of common law suggests that governments have
traditionally been able to prohibit a person from harming himself.
The crime of suicide is the most important illustration of this right. A
historical analysis of suicide in English and American common law
shows that an individual has not traditionally had the power to kill
himself. The historical right of government to prohibit a person from
harming himself implies that a state today could likewise proscribe
self-abortion.
A. Suicide as a Crime in English Common Law
An examination of English common law reveals that England
traditionally had the power to criminalize suicide. The prohibition of
suicide in English history began in 673 when the Catholic Church
condemned the act in its canon of law.83 King Edgar formally pro-
scribed suicide in 969, stating: “It is neither lawful to celebrate Mass
for the soul of one who by any diabolical instigation hath voluntarily
committed murder on himself, nor to commit his body to the ground
with hymns and psalmody or any rites of honorable sepulture.”84
Legal scholars also contemplated the crime of suicide early in the
formation of the common law. In his authoritative treatise written
approximately between the years of 1220 and 1260,85 Henry de Brac-
ton argued that suicide was a serious crime under the common law:
83. G. STEVEN NEELEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE 45 (1996).
84. Id. at 45–46 (quoting JAMES J. O’DEA, SUICIDE: STUDIES ON ITS PHILOSOPHY,
CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 311–12 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1882)).
85. See Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 57
(1985) (estimating the date of de Bracton’s treatise).
072903 ALFORD.DOC 09/03/03 4:54 PM
2003] SELF-ABORTION 1025
“Just as a man may commit felony by slaying another so he may do so
by slaying himself, the felony is said to be done to himself.”86
The first judicial decision explaining the crime of suicide was
Hales v. Petit,87 decided by the Court of King’s Bench in 1562. In
Hales, the court considered the conduct of a man who voluntarily en-
tered a river and purposefully permitted himself to drown.88 The court
considered his conduct to be a felony equal to the murder of another
person: “this act which he has done to himself, is to be considered in
the same light as if he had done it to another.”89 The court determined
that the appropriate punishment for suicide was the forfeiture of a
person’s remaining goods, debts, and chattels to the king.90
Although the court strongly analogized suicide to felonious mur-
der, it further discussed the unique nature of the crime, labeling it “an
offence against nature, against God, and against the King.”91 The
court’s analysis further shows the gravity of the offense of suicide, in
that it is morally considered a “greater offence” than the murder of
another.92 The many justifications offered by the Hales court for the
condemnation of suicide, therefore, suggest that a state has a strong
interest in criminalizing self-murder and a right to do so.
In the mid-seventeenth century, Edward Coke examined the
common law’s treatment of suicide.93 He argued that suicide was a
felony against one’s self that was similar to murder of another.94 “Felo
de se is a man, or woman, which being compos mentis, of sound mem-
ory, and of the age of discretion, killeth himself, which being lawfully
found by the oath of twelve men, all the goods and chattels of the
party so offending are forfeited.”95 Coke incorporated elements of the
common law’s treatment of murder into his analysis of suicide. For in-
stance, he stated that a person must be of sound mind to be criminally
86. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 423 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans., Belknap Press of the Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (n.d.).
87. 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B. 1562); NEELEY, supra note 83, at 47.
88. Hales, 75 Eng. Rep. at 390.
89. Id. at 395.
90. Id. at 399.
91. Id. at 400.
92. Id.
93. See Marzen et al., supra note 85, at 60–61 (discussing the influence of Coke’s treatise).
94. Id.
95. COKE, supra note 49, at 54.
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liable for suicide, just as a person must be of sound mind to be con-
victed of murder.96
More recent legal historians have articulated similar rules re-
garding suicide. Matthew Hale, writing nearly a century later than
Coke, described the law’s treatment of suicide in similar terms. Like
Coke, he labeled suicide a felo de se “where a man of the age of dis-
cretion, and compos mentis, voluntarily kills himself by stabbing, poi-
son, or any other way.”97 Hale determined that, as long as a person
was not insane when committing suicide, the person had committed a
felony and his “goods and chattles” were subject to forfeiture.98 Simi-
larly, William Blackstone acknowledged the felonious nature of sui-
cide in his authoritative Commentaries on the Laws of England.99 He
wrote that one who commits suicide is guilty of a “double offence;
one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing
into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against
the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his sub-
jects.”100 He noted that a person who commits suicide deserved harsh
punishment. Not only should one who commits suicide forfeit his
goods and chattels, but also his remaining legacy should be tarnished
by “an ignomious burial in the highway, with a stake driven through
his body.”101 Blackstone noted that these punishments would serve as
a deterrent, explaining that “his care for either his own reputation, or
the welfare of his family, would be some motive to restrain him from
so desperate and wicked an act.”102 Thus, from early in English history
through the time of American colonization, the common law consid-
ered suicide a felonious act, and the government had an interest in
protecting its citizens from carrying out this crime against themselves.
B. Suicide as a Crime in American Common Law
English common law played a significant role in the development
of early American law, although its influence varied widely from col-
96. See id. (“If a man lose his memory by the rage of sickness or infirmity, or otherwise,
and kill himself while he is not compos mentis, he is not felo de se: for, as he cannot commit
murder upon another, so in that case he cannot commit murder upon himself.”).
97. 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 411 (George Wilson ed., Dublin, E. Lynch 1778).
98. See id. at 412–13 (“[A] lunatic killing himself in the fit of lunacy is not felo de se . . . .”).
99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *190.
102. Id.
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ony to colony.103 The colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, and Maryland all ac-
cepted the English common law’s treatment of suicide as a punishable
crime.104 Virginia followed the English common law tradition of pun-
ishing suicide by the confiscation of goods and chattels and ignomini-
ous burial.105 Indeed, Pennsylvania was the only colony that did not
follow the lead of the English common law in criminalizing suicide.
Pennsylvania adopted a law in 1701 that decriminalized suicide by
eliminating forfeiture as a punishment for the act.106
However, with the end of colonial times came a gradual phasing
out of suicide laws.107 The elimination of legal penalties for suicide
was not, however, based upon the belief that a person had a funda-
mental and uninhibited right to harm himself. A treatise written in
1796 by Zephaniah Swift, later chief justice of Connecticut’s highest
court, explains the reasons for eliminating legal punishment of sui-
cide:
There can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish
an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge upon
lifeless clay, that is insensible of the punishment. There can be no
greater cruelty, than the inflicting a punishment, as the forfeiture of
goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of the of-
fender. This odious practice has been attempted to be justified upon
the principle, that such forfeiture will tend to deter mankind from
103. Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57, 60–61 (1982).
104. Id. at 61; see also Marzen et al., supra note 85, at 65 (stating that Maryland adopted the
common law penalties for suicide). Connecticut applied the common law treatment as well, but
did not enforce any confiscations of property for suicide. Marzen et al., supra note 85, at 65.
Massachusetts prohibited the confiscation of a suicide’s property but enacted a statute that re-
quired ignominious burial of a suicide’s body, thus punishing the person who committed suicide
but not his heirs. Id. The Massachusetts statute read in part: “This Court considering how far
Satan doth prevail upon several persons within this Jurisdiction, to make away themselves,
judgeth that God calls them to bear testimony against such wicked and unnatural practices, that
others may be deterred therefrom . . . .” Burgess-Jackson, supra note 103, at 64 (quoting THE
COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 137 (William H. Whitmore ed., Boston, Rockwell &
Churchill 1887)).
105. Burgess-Jackson, supra note 103, at 61.
106. Id. at 65. The pertinent part of the statute read: “If any person, through Temptation or
melancholly, shall Destroy himself, his Estate, Real & Personal, shall, notwithstanding, Descend
to his wife and Children or Relations as if he had Died a natural death . . . .” Id. (quoting THE
EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1681–1713 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978)).
107. Penalties for suicide were abolished in Maryland and New Jersey in 1776, North Caro-
lina in 1778, New Hampshire in 1783, Delaware in 1792, Rhode Island in 1798, and Virginia in
1847. Marzen et al., supra note 85, at 67.
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the commission of such crimes, from a regard to their families. But it
is evident that where a person is so destitute of affection for his
family, and regardless of the pleasures of life, as to wish to put an
end to his existence, that he will not be deterred by a consideration
of their future subsistence.108
Thus, the states eliminated the legal prohibitions against suicide in
order to avoid punishing a suicide victim’s family, not because they
thought a person had a right to kill himself.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has examined suicide in the
context of physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg,109
the Court upheld Washington’s ban on assisted suicide.110 Crucial to
the Court’s reasoning was its determination that the United States
Constitution did not afford an individual a fundamental right to
commit suicide: “we are confronted with a consistent and almost uni-
versal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right [to commit
suicide], and continues explicitly to reject it today.”111 The Court fur-
ther noted that “for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common law
tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and
assisting suicide.”112 While acknowledging that legal punishment of
suicide has been eliminated in all states, it concluded that this trend in
the law did not reflect a right to commit suicide or even acceptance of
the act, but rather showed the states’ desire to not punish a suicide’s
family.113 Thus, the Court suggests that a person does not have a con-
stitutionally protected right to kill himself.
There is a strong analogy between a state’s right to proscribe sui-
cide and a state’s right to proscribe self-abortion. The common law
history of suicide and the modern interpretation of this history set
forth important limitations on a person’s right to self-autonomy. Al-
though a person is guaranteed great personal liberty under the federal
constitution, there are bounds on that autonomy, even when a per-
son’s conduct does not impede the rights of others. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that a state has an “unqualified interest
in the preservation of human life” that limits a person’s right to
108. Id. at 68–69 (quoting S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON
LAW 32 (2d ed. 1982)).
109. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
110. Id. at 705–06.
111. Id. at 723.
112. Id. at 711.
113. Id. at 713.
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autonomy such that he has no right to kill himself.114 Similarly, al-
though a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy before her fe-
tus is viable, there are bounds on this liberty interest, based on a
state’s interest in the preservation of a woman’s life.115 Abortion poses
great danger to the woman who performs it upon herself.116 Conse-
quently, although a woman has a right to personal autonomy, the
state’s interest in her life can proscribe activities that endanger it, in-
cluding self-abortion.
CONCLUSION
Self-abortion is a personal act performed by a woman on her
own body. Despite its private nature, self-abortion is not a fundamen-
tal right. Under the Glucksberg analysis, a right cannot be considered
fundamental unless it is “deeply rooted” in American history and tra-
dition. The history of abortion law in England and the United States
shows that self-abortion was not a “deeply rooted” right. Moreover, a
state has also traditionally been able to enact paternalistic laws pro-
tecting a citizen from himself, as seen through the legal history of sui-
cide. This traditional power of a state to protect a woman from her-
self further shows that self-abortion, an act that can result in serious
injury to one’s self, is not a fundamental right. Although the wisdom
of criminally sanctioning a woman who would resort to such a dan-
gerous and desperate measure is questionable, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass a right to
self-abort at any time during pregnancy.
114. Id. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).
115. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
